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THE 1994 AMENDMENTS TO THE
WYOMING RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Joel L. SeligOn August 31, 1994, the Supreme Court of Wyoming amended sixteen
of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. The amendments became effective
on November 29, 1994. In this Article, Professor Selig describes and
analyzes these amendments for practitionersand other interested readers.
The Wyoming amendments adopt, with some additions and modificaions, many but not all of the 1993 amendments to the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure. Part I of this Article analyzes the amended Rule 11, which
governs the signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers, the consequent
representations to the court, and sanctions for frivolous litigation. Part II
notes Wyoming's rejection of the federal self-executing mandatory disclosure
regime and then considers the changes in discovery procedures effected by
amendments to Rules 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, and 37 Part I11(A)
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describes amendments to Rules 1 and 16; Part Il1(B) covers technical
amendments to Rules 38, 50, and 52; and Part Il(C) discusses amendments
to Rules 54 and 58 relating to judgments, costs, and attorneys' fees. The
Article concludes that notwithstanding significant differences between the
Wyoming Rules and the Federal Rules, the general congruence between the
Wyoming and federal procedural systems continues to provide the benefits of
uniformity while accommodating local variations.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS

INTRODUCTION

A study published in 1986 surveyed state procedural systems to assess
the degree of similarity between state court civil procedure and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).' The states most closely approximating the
approach of the Federal Rules were classified as federal "replica" jurisdictions, based on a strict test requiring that nine separate criteria be met; other
states were classified according to the kind and degree of their variation from
federal replica status.2 Wyoming was one of 23 states in the group that met
the criteria for federal replica status.' With respect to these states, it could be
said without significant qualification that there was one system of procedure
for state and federal courts.4 Wyoming's federal replica status was summarized in this study as follows:
In 1957, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure transformed
Wyoming's civil procedure from code pleading into a notice pleading
replica of the Federal Rules. Amendments effective in 1971 conformed the Wyoming rules to the joinder and discovery provisions of
the amended FRCP, preserving Wyoming's replica status. The Wyoming Supreme Court considers federal rules decisions persuasive authority in interpreting its own similar rules. The Court has enjoyed
"complete rulemaking power" by statute since 1947.1
Developments since this 1986 study have maintained Wyoming's
status as a Federal Rules replica jurisdiction. Of course, there are today,
as there have been from the beginning, significant differences between the
Federal Rules and the Wyoming Rules. Those differences reflect, for
example, Wyoming procedures that do not exist in the federal system, and
vice versa; 6 numerous differences in detail; 7 and, in some cases, differences between Wyoming and federal procedural policy.8 For the most
part, however, the Wyoming Rules and the Federal Rules are the same.
The benefits of this federal-state procedural uniformity are obvious both
to practitioners and to the judiciary.

1. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure,61 WASH. L. REv. 1367 (1986).
2. Id. at 1369, 1372-75.
3. Id. at 1377.
4. Id. at 1372.
5. Id. at 1424 (foomotes omitted).
6. See, e.g., Wyo. R. Civ. P. 40.1(b)(l) (peremptory disqualification of judge); FED. R.

CIV. P. 72-76 (trial by federal magistrate judge and appeal from magistrate judge to district judge).
7. E.g., compare Wyo. R. CIV. P. 6(c) (motion practice) with FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (same).
8. E.g., compare Wyo. R. Civ. P. 51(b) (court shall instruct jury on law before argument)
with FED. R. CIV. P. 51 (court, at its election, may instruct jury before or after argument, or both).
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In recent years, a process of review and revision of the Wyoming
Rules has generally reinforced this procedural uniformity by incorporating
amendments to the Federal Rules to the extent considered appropriate and
desirable for Wyoming civil practice. The Supreme Court of Wyoming
has been assisted in this endeavor by the Civil Division of its Permanent
Rules Advisory Committee of practitioners and judges. The process of
federal amendment and Wyoming review is a continuous federal-state
interaction. Tinkering at the federal level seems never to cease, and states
like Wyoming are obliged to decide to what extent they wish to adopt the
federal amendments. As a result of a comprehensive review of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (WRCP) comparing them to the FRCP as
amended over the years, the Wyoming Supreme Court issued orders in
1991 and 1992 making extensive amendments to the WRCP.9 Most recently, in response to the 1993 amendments to the FRCP,'0 the court
issued an order on August 31, 1994, adopting amendments to the WRCP
which became effective on November 29, 1994." These 1994 Wyoming
amendments are the focus of this Article.
The 1993 FRCP amendments affected 30 federal rules. 2 Although
many of the federal amendments were technical or otherwise relatively
noncontroversial, some were controversial, and there were disagreements

9. 818-822 P.2d Wyo. Rep. xlvii-cxxxviii (1991) (order of December 20, 1991, revising
WRCP [effective April 28, 1992]); 823-832 P.2d Wyo. Rep. xxiv-xxvii (1992) (order of April 28,
1992, amending WRCP [effective April 28, 1992]); 837-839 P.2d Wyo. Rep. xvii-xxxi (1992) (order
of October 22, 1992, amending WRCP [effective January 12, 1993]); 837-839 P.2d Wyo. Rep. xxxiixliv (1992) (order of November 30, 1992, amending WRCP [effective February 25, 1993]).
10. 146 F.R.D. 405-500 (1993).
The 1993 FRCP amendments and related materials are published at 146 F.R.D. 401-728
(1993). and citations herein are to the F.R.D. page numbers. Readers who do not have Federal Rules
Decisions may find the same materials printed in identical form at 113 S. Ct. 475-802 (1993). To
convert from the F.R.D. citation to the S. Ct. citation, add 74 to the F.R.D. page number to produce
the italicized page number in volume 113 of the Supreme Court Reporter. The italicized page numbers in S. Ct. denote pages of the volume that precede the pages reporting cases, which are separately
numbered.
The materials published in the foregoing locations include, in.addition to the rules as amended, the unamended rules with new material underlined and deleted material lined through, federal
advisory committee notes, and other related materials.
11. Order Amending Rules 1, 11, 16, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38, 50. 52, 54, and 58,
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (Wyo. Aug. 31, 1994), 878 P.2d cxlv - clxxvi (advance sheets)
(will not appear in P.2d bound volume, but will appear in P.2d Wyo. Rep. bound volume). The order
provided that the amended rules "shall become effective 60 days after their publication in the advance
sheets of the Pacific Reporter." Id. at cxlv. Since the amended rules were published in the September
30, 1994, advance sheets, they became effective on November 29, 1994. Id. at i.
12. 146 F.R.D. 405-500.
The rules affected are Rules 1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 15, 16, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38,
50, 52, 53, 54, 58, 71A, 72, 73, 74, 75, and 76, and new Rule 4.1. In addition, Form 18-A is abrogated,
new Forms IA, IB, and 35 are added, and Forms 2. 33, 34, and 34A are amended. Id.
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within both the federal advisory committee and the federal Judicial Conference committee that prepared and approved the various changes. 3
In an unusual action, Chief Justice Rehnquist's letter transmitting the
1993 FRCP amendments to the Speaker of the House contained a sentence
which could be construed as distancing the Court from the actual content of
the amendments: "While the Court is satisfied that the required [Rules Enabling Act] procedures have been observed, this transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these amendments in
the form submitted."' 4 Justice White issued a separate statement discussing
the limited role of the Court (as opposed to the originating committees) in the
rulemaking process. 5 Justice Scalia issued a statement dissenting from the
amendments to Rule 11 (relating to sanctions for frivolous litigation), and
from the amendments to Rules 26, 30, 31, 33, and 37 (relating to discovery). 16 Justice Thomas joined both parts of Justice Scalia's dissenting statement; Justice Souter joined the part relating to the discovery rules.' 7 However, despite efforts that some thought would persuade the Congress to delay or
delete some provisions," the federal amendments went into effect on December 1, 1993, without any delays, deletions, or revisions. Now that these
amendments have gone into effect, it seems considerably less likely that any
of them will soon be altered by legislative action.
Many of the 1993 federal amendments have been adopted in the
1994 Wyoming amendments. The 1994 WRCP amendments affect 16
Wyoming rules. 9 The overall impact generally enhances federal-state
13. 146 F.R.D. at 518.
14. Id. at 403.
15. Id. at 501-06. Justice White stated:
[A]s I have seen the Court's role over the years, it is to transmit the Judicial Conference's
recommendations without change and without careful study, as long as there is no suggestion that the committee system has not operated with integrity.... This has been my practice, even though on several occasions, based perhaps on out-of-date conceptions, I had
serious questions about the wisdom of particular proposals to amend certain rules.
Id. at 505.
16. Id. at 507-13.
17. Id. at 507.
18. The Rules Enabling Act provides:
The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in
which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed
rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December I of the year in which such rule
is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.
28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
19. Order, supra note 11, 878 P.2d at cxlv (advance sheets).
The rules affected are Rules 1, 11, 16, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38, 50, 52, 54,
and 58. Id.
Some of the 1993 FRCP amendments not adopted in Wyoming affect Federal Rules 4, 5, 12,
15, 32, 36, 53, 71A (corresponding to Wyoming Rule 71.1), 72-76 (no corresponding Wyoming
rules), and new Federal Rule 4.1. Compare id. with 146 F.R.D. 405-500.
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uniformity, with one major exception involving discovery. This Article
surveys the 1994 WRCP amendments to assist practitioners and other
interested readers.
I. RULE 11: REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT AND SANCTIONS FOR
FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION

Rule 11 is an effort to promote candor and care in litigation. The basic
mechanism of the revised rule consists of a declaration that an attorney or
unrepresented party "signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating.. a
pleading, written motion, or other paper"' is certifying the positions being
advocated and is subject to sanctions if the rule's standards for proper certification are not met. The rule as last revised in 1983 had been the subject of
considerable criticism and a large amount of satellite litigation.2" The 1993
FRCP amendments represent an effort to respond to the criticisms and to
increase the rule's effectiveness while reducing litigation over sanctions."
The federal rule has been extensively revised, and the 1994 Wyoming
amendments have adopted the federal revisions so that the Wyoming rule is
now virtually identical to the new federal rule.'
The new rule tightens to some degree the obligations imposed by
certification while also loosening to some degree the standards for proper
certification. It narrows the circumstances under which sanctions will be
imposed, and it attempts to equalize the rule's impact on plaintiffs and
defendants. The most important changes are as follows.
Rule 11 certifications are now made not only by signing a particular paper, but also by "later advocating" the paper.' Thus, the rule is
violated by continuing to advocate a position that did not initially

20. Rule 11(b).
The shortened format 'Rule
"is used here and hereinafter for citations to the rules. It
usually is clear from the context of the text to which the footnote is attached whether the citation is to
' or 'Wyoming
a federal rule or a Wyoming rule. When this is not clear, the format 'Federal Rule
Rule
' is used. When the text itself identifies the specific rule discussed, there is no redundant
footnote citation.
21.

See GENE R. SIiREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN,

UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 48, at 204-05 (2d ed. 1994); id. at 204 n.5 ("Probably more has been written about Rule 11 since
1983 than about any other civil procedure topic."); id. at 205 & n.10 ('Between 1983 and 1989,
there were 1000 reported Rule 11 cases," which "indicates that there may have been as many as
10,000 Rule 11 cases altogether [including unreported cases] in this six-year period.").
22. See Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 583-84.
23. The one difference is that the Wyoming rule does not contain the reference to "disclosures" that appears in Federal Rule 11(d), because Wyoming has not adopted the new Federal Rule
26(a) on self-executing required disclosures. See infra text accompanying notes 65-84.
24. Rule 11(b).
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violate the rule but at a later stage lacks sufficient support. Although
the paper need not be amended or withdrawn under these circumstances,25 the rule imposes a continuing duty on the advocate who subsequently learns that the position lacks merit, rather than a more limited
duty merely to satisfy the rule's requirements at the time the paper is
initially filed (the "snapshot" approach). Moreover, the certification
now clearly applies not only to the paper as a whole, but also to individual "claims, defenses, and other legal contentions, " ' and to individual "allegations and other factual contentions, "27 These changes
significantly strengthen the rule's requirements.
With regard to claims, defenses, and other legal contentions, the
advocate is now certifying that they "are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law or the establishment of new law. "I This differs in two
respects from the previous standard. By substituting "nonfrivolous" 29
for "good faith," 3" the new rule replaces a subjective standard with an
objective standard, thus "eliminat[ing] any 'empty-head pure-heart'
justification for patently frivolous arguments." 3' This change strengthens the rule's requirements. On the other hand, the new rule's allowance of nonfrivolous arguments for "the establishment of new law" 32 is
more generous in accommodating novel legal contentions.
With regard to allegations and other factual contentions, the
standard also is more generous, requiring only that they "have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery." 33 This language replaces the old requirement that the paper
be "well grounded in fact. "I The new rule also provides that "denials
of factual contentions" must be "warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, . . . reasonably based on a lack of information

25. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 586.
26. Rule l1(b)(2).
27. Rule 1l(b)(3).
28. Rule 1 l(b)(2) (emphasis added).

29. Rule 1l(b)(2).
30. Old Rule II(a).
31. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 586-87.
A quasi-hypothetical example of the "empty-head pure-heart" approach: "Your Honor, my
legal research wasn't very good but I was acting in good faith when I asked the court to declare the
United States government's printing of paper money unconstitutional." Cf. Skurdal v. State ex rel.
Stone, 708 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Wyo. 1985) ("perhaps the most frivolous appeal ever filed here").
32. Rule l(b)(2).
33. Rule l1(b)(3).
34. Old Rule 11(a).
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or belief. "3S These two changes taken together are intended to equalize
the burdens on plaintiffs and defendants.36
In addition to the foregoing provisions, of course the new rule retains the provision making it a violation to present a paper "for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."" On the other hand, the new rule
makes clear that certification standards and sanctions regarding discovery,
which are covered by Rules 26 through 37, are to be dealt with under
those rules rather than under the more general provisions of Rule 11,
which now "do not apply" to such matters. 3
Perhaps the most significant changes to Rule 11 involve the question of sanctions. First, the new rule contains a "safe harbor" provision allowing a party to withdraw or amend a covered paper or position upon notice by the opposing party of its intention to seek sanctions if the party does not do so. Thus, a sanctions motion is to be
served "but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless,
within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the
court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
39
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected."
This provision, allowing a party to correct a possible violation by
withdrawing or amending the offending submission, should substantially reduce satellite litigation, permitting many problems to be resolved
without judicial intervention. The safe harbor also removes what had
been a disincentive to abandoning questionable contentions created by
fear that to do so would provide evidence of a rule violation and lead
to mandatory sanctions.' ° The new approach should achieve the salutary purposes of the rule in many cases without litigation. Moreover,
withdrawal or amendment of the offending submission may frequently
result from a telephone call or other informal contact which does not
require the potential moving party to expend the time necessary actually to prepare a sanctions motion.4' An informal resolution facilitated or
induced by the safe harbor provision is plainly superior to the "slash
35. Rule 11(b)(4).
36. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 586.
On the subject of the impact of Rule it on civil rights plaintiffs, see Carl Tobias, Civil
Rights Plaintiffs and the ProposedRevision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1775 (1992); Carl Tobias,
Certification and Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223 (1991); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litiga37 BUFF. L. REv. 485 (1988/89).
tion,
37. Rule Il(b)(1).
38. Rule 11(d); Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 592.
39. Rule 1I(c)(1)(A).
40. See Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 591.
41. See id.
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and burn" sanctions motion now sometimes encountered in overzealous
or tactically motivated Rule 11 litigation.
Second, even if informal resolution proves impossible and a sanctions
motion is filed, under the new rule sanctions are discretionary rather than
mandatory. 2 The rule also states that sanctions "may consist of, or include,
directives of a nonmonetary nature." 43 The federal advisory committee note
lists a wide variety of nonmonetary sanctions, as well as a large number of
factors to inform the court's discretionary determination whether to issue
sanctions and what sanctions would be appropriate under the circumstances. '
Third, since the rule's purpose is deterrence rather than compensation
for expenses occasioned by a violation, 5 the revised version provides that
any sanction "shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated."' One possible
monetary sanction specifically mentioned by the rule is "an order to pay a
penalty into court." 47 This is not the only possible monetary sanction, because the rule goes on to authorize an order compensating the moving party
for attorneys' fees and expenses occasioned by the violation "if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence." However, the federal advisory committee note emphasizes that the latter remedy should be reserved for
"unusual circumstances, particularly for (b)(1) [improper purpose] violations," and that "if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be
paid into court as a penalty. "' On the other hand, an award of fees and
expenses "incurred in presenting or opposing the [sanctions] motion" 0 (as
opposed to those "incurred as a direct result of the violation"5 1) may be made
"[i]f warranted" 52 (as opposed to "if ... warranted for effective deterrence"5 3); such an award is not reserved for unusual circumstances.

42. The new rule provides that "the court may, subject tothe conditions stated below, impose an
appropriate sanction." Rule 11(c). The previous version of the rule provided that "the court ...shall
impose... an appropriate sanction." Old Rule ll(a).
43. Rule 11(c)(2).
44. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 587.
The possible nonmonetary sanctions listed are: "striking the offending paper; issuing an
admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; .. .referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys, to
the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head), etc." Id.
45. Id.
46. Rule I1l(c)(2).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 587-88.
50. Rule II(c)(1)(A).
51. Rule 11(c)(2).
52. Rule ll(c)(1)(A).
53. Rule 11(c)(2).
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Finally, two other provisions of the new rule are notable because
their purpose is to change the law declared in two United States Supreme
Court decisions. First, contrary to Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group," the new rule explicitly provides that "[a]bsent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations
committed by its partners, associates, and employees." 55 This desirable
change encourages proper law firm supervision of those acting on its
behalf. Moreover, "[s]ince [a sanctions] motion may be filed only if the
offending paper is not withdrawn or corrected within 21 days after service
of the motion, it is appropriate that the law firm ordinarily5 6 be viewed as
jointly responsible under established principles of agency."
Second, the new rule changes an interpretation of the old rule's
language announced in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,57 which held that sanctions can be imposed on a represented party who signs a paper that is subject to Rule 11. The Business
Guides interpretation of the old rule's language probably was legally
correct albeit unfortunate as a matter of policy. Contrary to Business
Guides, the language of the new rule specifically provides that only unrepresented parties are held to the certification requirement of what is
now subdivision (b) (which in the case of represented parties applies only
to their attorneys)." The new rule further provides that sanctions may be
imposed only "upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. "59 Although the actual
result in Business Guides itself might have been the same under the new
rule because the represented party there may well have been "responsible
for the violation,"6 in most cases the sanction would be against the attorneys of a represented party and not the represented party, because only
the attorneys could violate subdivision (b). In addition, even if a represented party is "responsible for the violation," the new rule further provides that "[m]onetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represent-

54. 493 U.S. 120 (1989) (Rule 11 does not authorize court to impose sanction against law firm
of signing attorney, even when attorney explicitly signs "on behalf of" firm) (8-1 decision, with Marshall, J., dissenting).
55.

Rule ll(c)(l)(A).

56. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 588-89.
57. 498 U.S. 533 (1991) (5-4 decision, with Kennedy, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.,
and joined in part by Scalia, J., dissenting).
58.
59.

Rule 11(b).
Rule 11(c).

60. See Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 535-39 (reviewing the facts); id. at 550 (quoting the
This entire scenario could
district court's conclusion that " '[t]he entire lawsuit was a mistake ....
have been avoided if, prior to filing the suit, Business Guides simply had spent an hour .. and
checked the accuracy of the purported seeds.' ").

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol30/iss1/9

10

Selig: The 1994 Amendments to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure
1995

1994 CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS

ed party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2) [frivolous legal contentions]," 6 1 monetary responsibility for which, like the relevant expertise,
properly is assumed to reside with the represented party's attorneys.62
From a policy standpoint, the new rule makes more sense both in
theory and in practice than the interpretations of the old rule adopted in
Pavelic & Leflore and Business Guides. In both cases the effect of the revisions is best understood as a strengthening of the rule. More broadly, considering all the revisions to Rule 11, and Justices Scalia and Thomas to the
contrary notwithstanding, the revisions do not "render the [riule toothless."o

61. Rule 11(c)(2)(A).
62. See also Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 589 (this limitation insulates the rule
from attack under the Rules Enabling Act).
63. Statement of Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissenting from the Court's adoption
of the amendments to the federal nile, 146 F.R.D. at 507. Justice Scalia stated:
The proposed revision would render the Rule toothless, by allowing judges to dispense
with sanction[s], by disfavoring compensation for litigation expenses, and by providing a
21-day "safe harbor" within which, if the party accused of a frivolous filing withdraws the
filing, he is entitled to escape with no sanction at all.
Id. at 507-08.

Justice Scalia's argument against the safe harbor is perhaps at its strongest in the situation where an
attorney avoids Rule 11 sanctions by voluntarily dismissing a baseless complaint pursuant to Rule 41(aXl)(i).

the Supreme Court had held that sanctions could not be avoided by such a voluntary disUnder the old rule,
missal. Cooter & Gell v. Hartnarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). The Court there stated:
Baseless filing puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening courts and individuals
alike with needless expense and delay. Even if the careless litigant quickly dismisses the
action, the harm triggering Rule lI's concerns has already occurred. Therefore, a litigant
who violates Rule 11 merits sanctions even after a dismissal.
Id. at 398.
However, a court is not burdened if a baseless complaint is withdrawn before the court has
to nile on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although the burden on the defendant is a legitimate concern, but see id. (burden on individuals "is
irrelevant"), the countervailing consideration is that the court's burdens are substantially reduced if a
voluntary dismissal is taken during the safe harbor period before the court has to rule on a motion to
dismiss and a sanctions motion.
Of course, if an answer or motion for summary judgment has been served, then Rule
41(a)(l)(i) is inapplicable and a voluntary dismissal is available only by stipulation under Rule
41(a)(1)(ii). Moreover, if the court dismisses the complaint before the plaintiff files a voluntary dismissal, then a Rule 11 sanction is available against the plaintiff who resisted or ignored the motion to
dismiss, because in that event the boat has been expelled from the safe harbor: the plaintiff cannot
"withdraw" the complaint after it has been involuntarily dismissed. More fundamentally, the operation of the safe harbor in the Cooter & Cell situation creates a salutary incentive on the plaintiff to
take a voluntary dismissal rather than a disincentive to do so, and properly prefers voluntary, cooperative action over "hardball" litigation by the plaintiff or the defendant. Cf.id. at 412 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The only result of the Court's interpretation will be to
increase the frequency of Rule 11 motions and decrease that of voluntary dismissals.").
It should also be noted that the safe harbor provision applies only to sanctions on motion of
another party. For extreme situations, the court retains the power to order sanctions on its own initiative under Rule 1 l(c)(l)(B), although Rule Il(c)(2)(B) provides that "[m]onetary sanctions may not
be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary
dismissal . .. ." See also Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 592 ("[S]how cause orders [un-
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"Rather, [the rule] has been defanged and only the poisonous elements that
reduced civility and chilled advocacy have been removed."64 Indeed, in all
important respects the new rule is a decided improvement on its predecessor.
II. DISCOVERY
A. Overview; Rejection of the Mandatory DisclosureRegime
The 1993 FRCP amendments made a substantial number of changes in
the rules governing discovery. Unlike the situation regarding Rule 11, however, the 1994 WRCP amendments rejected significant portions of the federal
amendments. Although the rejection of some of the FRCP discovery amendments creates a major difference between the Wyoming Rules and the Federal Rules, Wyoming's selectivity in this regard is not inconsistent with, and
does not alter, its status as a Federal Rules replica jurisdiction.65
The major difference between the FRCP amendments and the WRCP
amendments is that Wyoming has rejected, at least for the time being, the
regime of self-executing required disclosures adopted by the federal
amendments. The federal amendments in question are contained in Rules
26(a), (d), (e)(1), and (f), and in a number of other federal rules' that
were amended to interact with the Rule 26 amendments.
The federal Rule 26 amendments introduce a mandatory discovery
conference67 and a prohibition on formal discovery prior to the conference;68
mandatory disclosures that must be made without awaiting a formal discovery
request; 69 and a broad duty to supplement the mandatory disclosures.7' The
mandatory disclosures include initial disclosures of potential witnesses and
documents "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the

der Rule 1l(c)(1)(B)] will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a contempt of
court. . . ").
In sum, although Cooter & Gell probably was correctly decided under the language and

structure of the old rule, the contrary result under the new rule's safe harbor provision reflects the
preferable policy.
64. Jerold Solovy, Laura Kaster & Kenneth Wittenberg, Curbing Frivolity in the Courts: UpdaredCure, NAT'L L.J.,
May 2, 1994, at A19, A20.
65. The pertinent Oaldey & Coon criteria for federal replica status require that "tie substance of the
state rules of civil procedure conform generally to the federal discovery rules as amended in 1970," and that
"to the extent the terms of the state rules.., are ... idiosyncratic or unconventional by federal standards,
such variation in practice is not at bottom inconsistent with the Federal Rules' philosophy of 'procedure as
the handmaiden of justice.' " OAKLEY & COON, supra note 1, at 1374.
66. Rules 11, 16, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 37.
67. Rule 26(f).
68. Rule 26(d).

69. Rule 26(a).
70. Rule 26(e)(1).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol30/iss1/9

12

Selig: The 1994 Amendments to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure

1995

1994 CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS

pleadings," 7 of damages computations and supporting evidence, 72 and of
insurance agreements;73 subsequent disclosures concerning expert testimony;74
and pretrial disclosures concerning trial witnesses and exhibits.7"
This mandatory disclosure regime was by far the most controversial
element of the 1993 FRCP amendments. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Souter and Thomas, dissented from the Court's adoption of the amendments to some of the discovery rules.76 They complained that the disclosure provisions "ha[d] been recommended in the face of nearly universal
criticism from every conceivable sector of our judicial system, including
judges, practitioners, litigants, academics, public interest groups, and
national, state and local bar and professional associations."' Although
"nearly universal" is hyperbolic, criticism had been widespread. Many
observers were surprised that the effort to derail the mandatory disclosure
regime in Congress did not succeed. 7" The House passed by voice vote a
bill that would have deleted Rule 26(a)(1), but the bill never reached the
floor of the Senate. 9
Wyoming's rejection of the mandatory disclosure regime perpetuates a
significant disuniformity between Wyoming civil procedure and federal civil
procedure.' a The disunifority is sufficiently significant that, in light of the
unpopularity of mandatory disclosure with many members of the bar, it may
be a significant forum selection factor in cases that could be brought either in

71. Rules 26(a)(1)(A) and (B).
72. Rule 26(a)(1)(C).
73. Rule 26(a)(1)(D).
74. Rule 26(a)(2).

75. Rule 26(a)(3).
76. Rules 26, 30, 31, 33, and 37.
77. 146 F.R.D. at 512.
Justice Scalia also stated:
This proposal is promoted as a means of reducing the unnecessary expense and delay that occur
in the present discovery regime. But the duty-to-disclose regime does not replace the current,
much-criticized discovery process; rather, it adds a further layer of discovery. It will likely
increase the discovery burdens on district judges, as parties litigate about what is "relevant" to
"disputed facts," whether those facts have been alleged with sufficient particularity, whether the
opposing side has adequately disclosed the required information, and whether it has fulfilled its
continuing obligation to supplement the initial disclosure.
Id. at 510.
Justice Scalia further argued that the new regime is inconsistent with the adversary system,
places "intolerable strain" on lawyers' ethical duties to their clients, and "should not be adopted
nationwide without a trial ran." Id. at 511, 513.
78. For the source of Congress' authority, see supra note 18.
79. RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, 1994 SUPPLEMENT
TO MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1994) (referring to H.R. 2814,

103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993)).
80. The federal district court for the District of Wyoming has its own disclosure regime. See
infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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federal or in state court. In any event, there also is substantial disuniformity
on this issue within the federal court system itself. The Federal Rules, in
addition to allowing the parties to stipulate out of Rule 26(a)(1)'s mandatory
initial disclosures, allow federal district courts to opt out both by local rule
and by orders in individual cases.81 Many district courts have opted out of
Rule 26(a)(1) by local rule, leading to what some have called the
"balkanization" of federal civil procedure,' although a recent survey indicates that about "two-thirds of the [federal] district courts have implemented
the initial disclosure [requirements of Rule 26(a)(1)] or implemented a similar
local rule. "3 The federal district court for the District of Wyoming has opted
out of Rule 26(a)(1) but has continued to implement an amended version of
its previously adopted disclosure regime; its Local Rule 26(e) is similar to
Federal Rule 26(a)(1).8 4

81. Rules 26(a)(1), (d), and (f); Rule 29.
82. FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 79, at 12.
Precise statistics vary according to the source and the time of survey. Field, Kaplan &
Clermont report as follows:
Many federal districts (currently about two-thirds of the 94 districts, including most major
ones) seem to have opted out of Rule 26(a)(1) in varying terms. Accordingly, one cannot
say that the era of mandatory disclosure has fully arrived....
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore mandatory disclosure. Rule[s] 26(a)(2) [disclosure of
expert testimony] and (3) [pretrial disclosures] [are] generally in effect. Moreover, about one-half
of those districts opting out of Rule 26(aX1) had or have implemented their own schemes of
disclosure, sometimes by local rule and sometimes by some sort of standing order more or less
buried at the local level. A recent short article tried to warn practitioners of this situation and
give some guidance in finding the relevant provisions in their particular district, or for
their case's particular judge. Card Tobias, Finding the New Federal Civil Procedures,
151 F.R.D. 177 (1993). On a less practical level, the riotous variety of approaches to disclosune-part of what has been termed the balkanization of civil procedure-raises concern for the
future of the Federal Rules' goal of general rules uniform across the nation.
Id. at 11-12.
See also SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 21, at 307 n.3 ("As of January 1994. 48 of
Of these, 28 have
the 94 district courts had [opted out of the required disclosure provisions] ....
adopted their own variants of the required disclosure rule. We therefore describe the 'default rule'
here; at this writing there is no uniform role."). See also infra note 83 and accompanying text.
83. Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp & Mark J. Pino, The Three Faces of Mandatory Disclosure, THE
WASHINGTON LAwYER, May/June 1994, at 37.

A survey by the Federal Judicial Center reported that of the 94 federal district courts, 37 had
implemented or opted in to Rule 26(a)(l)'s mandatory initial disclosure requirements; 26 had opted
out of Rule 26(a)(1) but implemented disclosure in some form through a local Civil Justice Reform
Act plan; and 31 had opted out of mandatory disclosure altogether. Id. at 46. "When categories one
and two are combined, sixty-three federal district courts have implemented some form of initial mandatory-disclosure requirement." Id. at 38.
The federal district court for the District of Wyoming is reported by this survey in category
two-opted out of Rule 26(a)(1) but implemented disclosure in some form through a local CIRA plan.
Id. at 46.
84. Order, In the Matter of Adoption of Amended Rules of Court, at 37-39 (D. Wyo. June 17,
1994) (Local Rule 26(e)) (self-executing routine discovery exchange). See also Order, In the Matter
of Adoption of Amended Rules of Court, at 37-39 (D. Wyo. Nov. 30, 1993) (same).
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B. Wyoming Rules Amendments Relating to Discovery
Because Wyoming rejected the mandatory disclosure features of the
1993 FRCP amendments, the 1994 WRCP amendments relating to discovery are considerably less extensive than their federal counterparts. Nevertheless, the Wyoming amendments have adopted, either in whole or with
appropriate modifications, federal amendments making significant changes
to eight of the discovery rules. The more significant of these changes are
now reviewed in numerical order of the Wyoming rules affected.
1. Rule 26: General Provisions Governing Discovery
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) as amended unconditionally authorizes any party
to depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions
may be presented at trial, eliminating the previous requirement of a motion and court order. Under the old rule experts were routinely deposed
upon motion and court order, or by voluntary agreement of the parties
without involvement of the court. The new rule sensibly dispenses with
the formality of a court order, in view of the fact that potential trial experts are routinely deposed. However, court involvement may still be
necessary absent agreement of the parties concerning significant details,
because under the new rule such depositions continue to be subject to
such restrictions as to scope and such provisions concerning fees and
expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
A new provision, Rule 26(b)(5), applies to the withholding of information otherwise discoverable based on claims of privilege, or protection
of trial preparation materials. Such claims must be made expressly, describing the nature of the materials not produced (without revealing information itself privileged or protected) so that other parties may assess the
applicability of the claimed privilege or protection. The federal advisory
committee note states that "[t]o withhold materials without such notice ... may be viewed as a waiver of the privilege or protection."'
The revised Rule 26(e)(2) reformulates the second part of the limited
duty to supplement discovery responses that were complete when made but
with respect to which other information is thereafter acquired. Under the old
formulation, such supplementation was required if the responding party obtained information demonstrating that the prior response was incorrect when
made or, though correct when made, was no longer true and the circumstances were such that a failure to amend the response was in substance a

85. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 639.
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knowing concealment. The new formulation simplifies this duty to supplement in a way that should avoid thorny problems of interpretation and application, and that enlarges the scope of the duty to supplement. Under the new
rule, a party must amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request for
production, or request for admission (but not deposition testimony) if the
party learns that the response is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
2. Rule 28: Persons Before Whom Depositions May Be Taken
Rule 28(b), on depositions taken in foreign countries, is amended to
provide that such depositions may be taken pursuant to any applicable
treaty or convention. The purpose of the amendment is to permit effective
use of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters, and of any future applicable treaty.' The term
'letter rogatory' is replaced by the more modem term 'letter of request'
(whether or not captioned a letter rogatory).
3. Rule 29: Stipulations Regarding Discovery Procedure
Rule 29 is amended to expand the ability of litigants to stipulate to
alterations in the otherwise prescribed discovery procedures and limitations. Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation modify procedures governing or limitations placed upon discovery.
However, court approval is required for stipulations extending the time
provided in Rules 33, 34, and 36 for responses to discovery, if such
extensions would interfere with any time set for completion of discovery,
for hearing of a motion, or for trial.
The amendment encourages counsel "to agree on less expensive and
time-consuming methods to obtain information, as through voluntary exchange of documents, use of interviews in lieu of depositions, etc."" For
example, even though Wyoming has rejected the mandatory disclosure regime, counsel can agree to abide by it or some variation on it if they wish,
or simply to exchange certain information informally, as is frequently arranged and implemented by letters or pursuant to oral agreements. In addition, "when more depositions or interrogatories are needed than allowed
under [the] rules ...[counsel] can, by agreeing to the additional
discovery,
88
eliminate the need for a special motion addressed to the court."
86. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 646.
87. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 648.
88. Id.
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4. Rule 30: Depositions Upon Oral Examination
Prior to the 1993 FRCP amendments, the Federal Rules did not contain
any presumptive numerical limits on depositions or interrogatories, although
some federal district courts imposed such limits by local rule. The 1993
federal amendments adopt presumptive numerical limits89 but, as in the case
of mandatory initial disclosures, 9° permit parties to stipulate out of the limits, 91 and also permit district courts to opt out either by local rule or by
orders in particular cases.' The federal district court for the District of Wyoming imposed a presumptive limit on the number of interrogatories prior to
the 1993 federal amendments, 93 and it has opted out of the 1993 presumptive
limits on the number of depositions.'
Before the situation at the federal level had evolved to the position
of the 1993 FRCP amendments, the Supreme Court of Wyoming adopted
presumptive deposition and interrogatory limits which could not be stipulated away by the parties but could be modified by the court in any case
for good cause shown. 95 These Wyoming presumptive limits were as follows: depositions upon oral examination-each party was limited to the
deposition of any other party, the deposition of one expert witness, and
three other depositions; depositions upon written questions-each party
was limited to three depositions, in addition to the depositions upon oral
examination;' and interrogatories-each party could serve on any other
party interrogatories not exceeding 30 in number including subparts."

89. Rules 30(a)(2)(A) (no more than a total of 10 depositions upon oral examination or upon
written questions may be taken by the plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by third-party defendants);
31(a)(2)(A) (same); 33(a) (no party may serve on any other party more than 25 interrogatories including discrete subparts).
90. See supra text accompanying note 81.
91. Rules 29, 30(a)(2), 31(a)(2), and 33(a).
92. Rule 26(b)(2) ("By order or by local rule, the court may alter the limits in these rules on
").
the number of depositions and interrogatories .
93. Order, In the Matter of Adoption of Revised Rules of Court, at 51 (D. Wyo. Nov. 2, 1992)
(effective Nov. 15, 1992) (Local Rule 33(b)) ("No party shall serve on any other party more than one set of
thirty (30) interrogatories in the aggregate, including all subparts, without leave of Court. Subparagraphs of
any interrogatoty shall relate directly to the subject matter of the interrogatory. ").
94. Order, In the Matter of Adoption of Amended Rules of Court, at 48 (D. Wyo. Nov. 30,
1993) (Local Rule 30(h)) ("Absent good cause shown, there shall be no limit on the number or length
of depositions."); id. at 49 (Local Rule 31) ("Absent good cause shown there shall be no limit on the
number or length of depositions upon written questions.").
95. Old Rules 30(a)(2) and (3); 31(a)(4) and (5); 33(a). These limits became effective in Wyoming on April 28, 1992. 823-832 P.2d Wyo. Rep. xxiv-xxvii (1992).
96. Old Rule 30(a)(2).
97. Old Rule 31(a)(4).
98. Old Rule 33(a).
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The 1994 WRCP amendments replace the previous Wyoming deposition limits with the presumptive limits of the 1993 FRCP amendments."
The new Wyoming Rule 30(a)(2)(A) limits the total number of depositions-including those upon oral examination and those upon written questions-to ten "by the plaintiffs," ten "by the defendants," and ten "by thirdparty defendants." These limits may be exceeded pursuant to the written
stipulation of the parties," ° or by leave of court, "which shall be granted to
the extent consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(1)(B)."' 0
Although the effect of these new presumptive limits as compared to
the previous ones will vary from case to case, depending on the number
and configuration of the parties and the kinds of depositions desired, it
seems fair to assume that in many cases the new limits will operate more
generously than the old ones. The provision allowing the parties to exceed
the limits upon written stipulation without court approval is a welcome
change from the previous prohibitory Wyoming rule. Most attorneys will
not stipulate to obviously unnecessary depositions either for the purpose
of keeping their own options open or for the purpose of increasing their
own fees. In any event, judges are unlikely to be able to identify such
abuses with any confidence.
In addition to the foregoing limitations on the number of depositions,
the new Rule 30(a)(2)(B) adopts the federal amendment requiring leave of
court, absent written stipulation of the parties, to depose a person who already has been deposed in the case.
The unamended Federal/Wyoming Rule 30(c) provided that "[e]xamination and cross-examination of [deposition] witnesses may proceed as
permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Federal/Wyoming Rules
of Evidence." The 1993 FRCP amendments add: "except Rules 103 and
615." The 1994 WRCP amendments add only: "except Rule 103."
Evidence Rule 103 deals with objections, motions to strike, and
offers of proof that must be made at trial to preserve for appeal errors in
evidentiary rulings. The federal and Wyoming amendments make it inapplicable to depositions because if it were applicable, it would conflict with
Rule 32(d)(3)(A)'s more lenient provision that non-avoidable objections
are not waived by failure to make them at depositions."

99. For the new Wyoming position on the interrogatory limit, see infra text accompanying
notes 105-08.

100. Rule 29; Rule 30(a)(2).
101. Rule 30(a)(2).
102. Rule 32(d)(3)(A) provides:
Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of
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As to Evidence Rule 615 on exclusion of witnesses ("The Rule"), the
federal amendment makes it inapplicable to depositions so that other witnesses are not automatically excluded from a deposition by the unilateral request
of a party, although they can be excluded by the court when appropriate
pursuant to Federal Rule 26(c)(5). 10 3 The Wyoming amendment, by mentioning Evidence Rule 103 but not Evidence Rule 615, adopts the contrary philosophy, thought to be reflected in Wyoming custom and practice, of allowing any party the unfettered discretion to invoke The Rule at a deposition in
the same circumstances and to the same extent as at trial.
Finally, the Wyoming amendments adopt the new federal provisions
which become Rules 30(d)(1) and (2). The new Rule 30(d)(1) provides that
"[any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated concisely and
in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner." It further provides that
"[a] party may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to
preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the
court, or to present a motion" for a court order terminating, or limiting the
scope and manner of the taking of, the deposition under what is now Rule
30(d)(3)." 4 The new Rule 30(d)(2) explicitly authorizes the court to regulate
the time permitted for the conduct of a deposition, and to impose sanctions,
including costs and attorneys' fees, on persons who impede, delay, or otherwise frustrate the fair examination of the deponent.
Each of these Rule 30(d) amendments is aimed at improperly disruptive or obstructive tactics, discovery abuses which are particularly aggravating and undoubtedly too common. However, there are limits to the
efficacy of this kind of rulemaking. The litigators and judges who administer the discovery rules are, after all, human beings. That inexorable fact
sometimes seems to beget a continuous quest by the guardians of the
Federal Rules to anticipate every conceivable problem, real or imagined,
and, some would say, to fortify and refortify the ramparts against human
imperfection. Nevertheless, this kind of quest is not unique to the law of
procedure, and the federal efforts at improvement in the procedural area

the deposition, unless the ground of objection is one which might have been obviated or
removed if presented at that time.
Id.
103. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 664.
Wyoming Rule 26(c)(1)(E) is the counterpart of Federal Rule 26(c)(5).
104. The problems addressed by the new Rule 30(d)(1) also are regulated by Wyoming's Uniform District Court Rule 601. The Supreme Court of Wyoming's order adopting the 1994 WRCP
amendments provides that "they shall supersede all other court roles that are in conflict therewith,
including but not limited to Rule 601, Uniform Rules of District Courts." Order, supra note 11, 878
P.2d at cxlv (advance sheets).
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's request, the Civil Division of the Permanent Rules Advisory
Committee will be recommending appropriate amendments to Uniform District Court Rule 601.
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are usually beneficent in their intent and frequently constructive in their
effect-or so it seems at least to this observer. In the present instance, the
problems are not imaginary, and the Rule 30(d) amendments specifically
addressing them are appropriate.
5. Rule 31: Depositions Upon Written Questions
The new Rule 31(a)(2)(A), which is consistent with the new Rule
30(a)(2)(A), replaces the previous Wyoming presumptive limit on the
number of depositions upon written questions. Absent written stipulation
of the parties or leave of court, both new rules limit the total number of
depositions, whether upon oral examination or upon written questions, to
ten by the plaintiffs, ten by the defendants, and ten by third-party defendants. Similarly, the new Rule 31(a)(2)(B), like the new Rule 30(a)(2)(B),
requires written stipulation or leave of court to depose a person who
already has been deposed in the case.
In addition, the new Rule 31(a)(4) adopts the federal amendments
reducing the time limits for serving cross questions, redirect questions,
and recross questions, so that the total time for developing such questions
is reduced from 50 to 28 days.
Finally, Rules 31(b) and (c) are amended to correct an oversight in
the previous Wyoming amending process by making Rule 31 consistent
with Rule 30(f) on the subject of delivery and custody of depositions.
6. Rule 33: Interrogatories to Parties
Although Rules 30 and 31 as amended adopt the federal presumptive
limits on the number of depositions, 05 Rule 33(a) retains the previous Wyoming presumptive limit of 30 interrogatories, rather than the federal limit of
25. This difference is appropriate because the lower federal limit was promulgated in the context of the federal mandatory disclosure regime, under
which the required initial disclosures provide substantial information that in
Wyoming remains a potential subject of interrogatories.
As in the case of the deposition limit, the new Rule 33(a) adopts the
federal position that the interrogatory limit may be exceeded either pursuant
to written stipulation or by leave of court. The new Rule 33(a) also incorporates the federal language providing that in counting the number of interrogatories against the limit, "all discrete subparts" are to be counted as separate interrogatories. Under the old Wyoming Rule 33(a), "subparts" were to

105. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol30/iss1/9

20

Selig: The 1994 Amendments to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure
1995

1994 CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS

be counted separately, but no elaboration was provided on what constitutes a
subpart. The federal advisory committee note characterizes the more discriminating criterion of "discrete" subparts as encompassing "questions that seek
information about discrete separate subjects." 1"6 The aim is to prevent evasion of the numerical limit by the device of joining such questions as
subparts.107 The note goes on to give an example of subparts that would not
be considered discrete: "a question asking about communications of a particular type should be treated as a single interrogatory even though it requests
that the time, place, persons present, and contents be stated separately for
each such communication."108

The new Rule 33(b) incorporates federal amendments on interrogatories to which the responding party objects. Rule 33(b)(4) requires that all
grounds for an objection be stated with specificity, and further provides
that any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless failure to
object is excused by the court for good cause shown. Rule 33(b)(1) requires the objecting party to answer the interrogatory to the extent it is
not objectionable, rather than to provide no answer even to the portions
that are not objectionable. For example, if an interrogatory is objected to
as overbroad or burdensome, it should be answered more narrowly or to
the extent that providing an answer is not burdensome."t 9 This commonsense approach should help keep the objecting party honest, better define
the contours of the objection, expedite discovery of the nonobjectionable
information, and reduce disputes leading to motions to compel.
7. Rule 34: Production of Documents
Rule 34 is amended to provide, consistently with Rule 33(b), that if
a request for production is objectionable only in part, the
nonobjectionable portions must be produced.

106.
107.
108.

Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 675.
Id.
Id. at 675-76.

109. See id. at 676.
The note provides the following other examples:
If ... an interrogatory seeking information about numerous facilities or products is
deemed objectionable, but an interrogatory seeking information about a lesser number of
facilities or products would not have been objectionable, the interrogatory should be answered with respect to the latter even though an objection is raised as to the balance of the
facilities or products. Similarly, the fact that additional time may be needed to respond to
some questions (or to some aspects of questions) should not justify a delay in responding
to those questions (or other aspects of questions) that can be answered within the prescribed time.
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8. Rule 37: Orders Compelling Discovery; Sanctions
Rule 37(a)(1), designating the appropriate court in which to make a
motion for an order compelling discovery, incorporates the federal
amendments. The rule now provides, with appealing simplicity, that an
application for an order to a party shall be made to the court in which the
action is pending, and an application for an order to a nonparty shall be
made to the court where the discovery is being, or is to be, taken. The
old rule divided such orders into three categories. The new rule reduces
the categories to two and broadens the second category, placing the deposition of a party into one category covering all types of discovery involving a party, and placing the deposition of a nonparty into a second category covering all types of discovery involving a nonparty.
Rule 37 also is amended to incorporate federal provisions requiring
a party moving either for an order compelling discovery or for certain
kinds of sanctions to confer or attempt to confer in good faith with the
person against whom relief is sought to try to resolve the matter voluntarily. A certification that this has been done is a precondition for moving
for relief from the court. The old Wyoming rule contained such a requirement, but it was worded somewhat differently, and it applied only to a
motion to compel discovery."' The new Wyoming rule adopts the federal
wording for the sake of uniformity. It also follows the federal rule in
imposing the requirement not only as a certification precondition for a
Rule 37(a)(2) motion to compel, but also as a certification precondition
for a motion for sanctions against a delinquent party under Rule 37(d)(2)
or (3), and as a basis for denying sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4) if the
court finds that the good faith effort at voluntary resolution was not in
fact made. The confer-in-good-faith requirement does not apply to sanctions involving failure to comply with a court order,"' failure to admit, 12
or a party's failure to appear at the party's own deposition." 3
In addition to incorporating some federal technical amendments,
Rule 37 is changed in one other significant respect: the new Rule 37(a)(4)
makes sanctions available not only if a motion to compel discovery is
granted, but also even if the court does not have to grant the motion to
compel because the requested discovery is provided after the motion is
filed. The policy here is to avoid exempting from sanctions (and thereby
rewarding) the dilatory tactic of waiting until a motion to compel is filed
110.
111.
112.
113.

Old Rule 37(a)(5).
Rule 37(b).
Rule 37(c).
Rule 37(d)(1).
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and only then providing the discovery requested. This approach is entirely
reasonable, particularly since there must already have been an effort to14
secure voluntary cooperation before the motion to compel was filed."
The approach is analogous to the carrot and stick created by Rule Il 's
safe harbor provision."'1
11I.OTHER WYOMING RULES AMENDMENTS
The remaining 1994 WRCP amendments, which are drawn largely
but not entirely from the 1993 FRCP amendments, are now reviewed in
numerical order.
A. Miscellaneous Amendments
1. Rule 1: Scope and Purpose of Rules
Rule 1 as amended incorporates the federal amendment adding the
phrase 'and administered' to the second sentence, which now reads:
"[These rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." The federal
advisory committee note explains that the purpose of the amendment is
"to recognize the affirmative duty of the court to exercise the authority
conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only
fairly, but also without undue cost or delay."" 6 The note goes on to state
that "[als officers of the court, attorneys share this responsibility with the
judge to whom the case is assigned."" 7
2. Rule 16: Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management
Rule 16(c) is amended to expand the list of subjects that may be considered and acted upon at any pretrial conference. The new or reworded items
on the list, adapted from the federal amendments, are: limitations or restrictions on expert testimony;"' the appropriateness and timing of summary
adjudication under Rule 56;"' the control and scheduling of discovery, including orders affecting discovery pursuant to Rule 26 and Rules 29 through
37;'" settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Rule 37(a)(2).
See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at535.
Id.
Rule 16(c)(4).
Rule 16(c)(5).
Rule 16(c)(6).
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dispute under Rule 40(b) or other alternative dispute resolution procedures;'
separate trial pursuant to Rule 42(b) of a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
third-party claim, or a particular issue;"' early presentation of evidence on a
manageable issue that could be the basis for a judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 50(a) or a judgment on partial findings under Rule 52(c); 'I time
limits for presenting evidence; and other matters that may facilitate the just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action."z
The revised Rule 16(c) also incorporates the federal amendment
providing that "[i]f appropriate, the court may require that a party or its
representative be present [at the pretrial conference] or reasonably available by telephone in order to consider possible settlement of the dispute."
The federal advisory committee note states that "[w]hether [the participant] would be the individual party, an officer of a corporate party, a
representative from an insurance carrier, or someone else would depend
on the circumstances .... The selection of the appropriate representative
should ordinarily be left to the party and its counsel." 26
B. Technical Amendments
1. Rule 38: Jury Trial of Right
Rule 38(b)(1) and Rule 38(d) are amended to make clear that a jury
demand must be filed as well as served, and that failure to meet both
requirements results in a waiver of jury trial.
2. Rule 50: Judgment as a Matter of Law in Jury Trials
Rule 50(a)(1) is amended to make clear "that judgments as a matter
of law in jury trials may be entered against both plaintiffs and defendants
and with respect to issues or defenses that may not be wholly dispositive
of a claim or defense. ,Iz7

Rule 16(c)(9).
Rule 16(c)(13).
Rule 16(c)(14).
Rule 16(c)(15).
Rule 16(c)(16).
Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 605.
The note further states:
Particularly in litigation in which governmental agencies or large amounts of money are
involved, there may be no one with on-the-spot settlement authority, and the most that
should be expected is access to a person who would have a major role in submitting a
recommendation to the body or board with ultimate decision-making responsibility.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
127. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 694.
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3. Rule 52: Judgment on Partial Findings
Rule 52(c), which applies to nonjury trials, is amended for the same
purpose as Rule 50(a)(1): to make clear "that judgments as a matter of
law

. . .

may be entered against both plaintiffs and defendants and with

respect to issues or defenses that may not be wholly dispositive of a claim
or defense." 28
C. Judgments, Costs, and Attorneys' Fees
1. Rule 54: Judgment; Costs
One amendment to Rule 54(a) deletes a cryptic sentence of the old
Wyoming rule that has no counterpart in the Federal Rules: "A direction
of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a
judgment, is an order. "129 The purpose of this deleted Wyoming provision
is unclear. To the extent it was intended to ensure that such an "order" is
not regarded as an appealable judgment, that purpose may be better
served by the sentence added to the amended rule to replace the deleted
sentence: "A court's decision0 letter or opinion letter, made or entered in
writing, is not a judgment."13
This addition to Rule 54(a), drafted with Wyoming judicial practice
specifically in mind, interacts with another special Wyoming provision
added as an amendment to Rule 58(b). Federal Rule 58, which corresponds to Wyoming Rule 58(b), states: "Every judgment shall be set forth
on a separate document." Wyoming Rule 58(b) as amended states: "Every
judgment shall be set forth on a separate document, shall be identified as
such, and may include findings of fact and conclusions of law." The last
clause of this Wyoming provision, which permits the judgment to include
findings of fact and conclusions of law, is inconsistent with federal practice, under which the Rule 58 judgment set out on a separate document is
to be distinct from any opinion or memorandum.' 31 However, the Wyoming provision is not intended to vitiate the separate document rule, and

128. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 695.
129. Old Rule 54(a).
130. Rule 54(a).
131.

11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2785,

at 14 (1973) ("It no longer is possible, as it was prior to 1963, for an opinion to have the effect of a judgment. Instead, there must be a separate document on which the judgment is set forth.");
id. at 14-15 n.44 (" 'The amended rule eliminates. . . uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document-distinct from any opinion or memorandum-which provides the
basis for the entry of judgment. . . .' Advisory Committee Note to 1963 amendment of Rule 58, 31
F.R.D. at 650.") ; see also Federal Form 32.
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as the amendment to Rule 54(a) makes clear, it does not allow a decision
letter or opinion letter to serve as a judgment. Rather, the result of the
amendments to Wyoming Rules 54(a) and 58(b) is that the judgment must
still be set forth on a separate document; must be identified as such; may
not be a decision letter or an opinion letter; but may include findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
While the Wyoming rule thus permits the judgment and findings of
fact and conclusions of law to be contained in the same document, it also
permits the federal practice of keeping the judgment entirely separate
from (although it may refer to) findings of fact, conclusions of law, or an
opinion. The federal practice is preferable because it eliminates any conceivable confusion as to the contents or the date of entry of the appealable
judgment, although the new Wyoming rule is drafted in a manner intended and designed to avoid such confusion.
The revised Rule 54 also incorporates a federal amendment providing a detailed procedure for initiating claims for attorneys' fees and related expenses which-unlike fees sought under the terms of a contract, for
example-are not an element of damages to be proved at trial. First, the
old Rule 54(d) becomes Rule 54(d)(1), and is amended to make clear that
it applies only to costs other than attorneys' fees (even if such fees are
characterized as part of the costs by the statute that makes them available). Then an entirely new Rule 54(d)(2) is added which prescribes the
procedure for advancing claims for attorneys' fees and related nontaxable
expenses "unless the substantive law governing the action provides for the
recovery of such fees as an element of damages to be proved at trial. 132
The procedure prescribed begins with the filing of a motion.' 33
There is a potential trap for the unwary here, because the motion must be
filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment, unless a statute or
court order otherwise provides." ' However, although the motion must be
filed within the 14-day period, and although it must provide specified
information including the amount sought or a fair estimate thereof, evidentiary material including documentation and final calculations may be
filed later in connection with the proceedings to determine what amount,
if any, is to be awarded.' 35 The rule also provides that the court may refer
issues relating to the value of services to a master.36

132.

Rule 54(d)(2)(A).

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Rule 54(d)(2)(B).
Rules 54(d)(2)(B)-(D); Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 701.
Rule 54(d)(2)(D).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol30/iss1/9

26

Selig: The 1994 Amendments to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure

1995

1994 CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS

The new Wyoming rule makes clear in language added to the federal
version that this provision is not intended to create any new right to
attorneys' fees or related expenses or to add to any such rights that already exist under Wyoming or other controlling law: Rule 54(d)(2)(A)
states that claims for attorneys' fees and expenses may be pursued under
the procedure provided "[w]hen [such claims are] allowed by law." The
federal advisory committee note explains that the purpose of the new Rule
54(d)(2) is to provide a procedure for "litigation not initially contemplated
by the rules-disputes over the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded
in

. .

. actions in which prevailing parties may be entitled to such awards

or in which the court must determine the fees to be paid from a common
fund."'" In Wyoming as in federal courts, the procedure will apply to

any case in which fees are recoverable but are not an element of damages
to be proved at trial. Some such cases in Wyoming courts arise under
Wyoming law.138 Others arise under federal law: fees are available to the
prevailing party in various actions under federal civil rights laws which
39
can be and often are brought in state court. 1
Finally, it should be noted that the Rule 54(d)(2) procedure does not
apply to claims for fees and expenses as sanctions for violations of the
rules of civil procedure. t"
2. Rule 58: Entry of Judgment
One amendment to Rule 58, discussed above in connection with Rule

54,141 is the addition of language to Rule 58(b)'s separate document rule,

which now reads: "Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document, shall be identified as such, and may include findings of fact and
conclusions of law."
The other amendment to Rule 58 relates to routine taxation of costs,
and to motions for attorneys' fees under the provision of Rule 54 discussed above. 42 A sentence added to Rule 58(c) provides:
Entry of the judgment shall not be delayed, nor the time for

137. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 700.
138. E.g., State v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259 (Wyo. 1994) (affirming fee award against Department
of Family Services to party who successfully defended allegation of paternity) (award authorized by
Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-14-126(b) (Cum. Supp. 1994), 14-2-114 (1994)).
139. E.g., actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), in which the prevailing party may recover
attorneys' fees and related nontaxable expenses under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b) (Supp. IV 1992)
(attorneys' fees), 1988(c) (Supp. IV 1992) (expert fees).
140. Rule 54(d)(2)(E).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
142. Rule 54(d)(2); see supra text accompanying notes 132-40.
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appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees, except that,
when a timely motion for attorney's fees is made under Rule
54(d)(2), the court, before the appellate court acquires jurisdiction, may order that the motion have the same effect on the time
for appeal for all parties as a timely motion under Rule 59.
Thus, although the filing of a Rule 54(d)(2) motion for attorneys' fees
does not of itself affect the finality of the underlying judgment on the
merits or the time for appeal from that judgment, Rule 58(c) permits (but
does not require) the court to suspend finality in the event of a timely
Rule 54(d)(2) motion in order to ensure that only one appeal need be
taken to cover both the merits and attorneys' fees. The federal advisory
committee's observations on the court's discretion in this regard are set
out in the margin."
CONCLUSION

The 1994 amendments to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure have
adopted many but not all of the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The most significant federal amendments not adopted involve the regime of self-executing required disclosures that is now tacked on
top of the federal discovery system. Notwithstanding this recent example of
selectivity and other significant differences between the Wyoming Rules and
the Federal Rules, Wyoming remains a federal replica jurisdiction. The
general congruence between the Wyoming and federal procedural systems
provides the benefits of uniformity while accommodating the need, or in
some instances simply the desire, for local variations.

143. Advisory Committee Note, 146 F.R.D. at 705. The note states:
Ordinarily the pendency or post-judgment filing of a claim for attorney's fees will not
affect the time for appeal from the underlying judgment. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson
& Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988). Particularly if the claim for fees involves substantial issues
or is likely to be affected by the appellate decision, the district court may prefer to defer
consideration of the claim for fees until after the appeal is resolved. However, in many
cases it may be more efficient to decide fee questions before an appeal is taken so that
appeals relating to the fee award can be heard at the same time as appeals relating to the
merits of the case.
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